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ARBITRATION OF WORKER CONTRACTS:
NEW PRIME'S PROPER STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION OF THE 1925
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
MargaretL. Moses*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court has been expanding the scope of arbitration under the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA" or "the
Act") since the 1980's.1 It was therefore somewhat unexpected
when the Court, in its recent unanimous decision in New Prime v.
Oliveira,2 decided to limit the application of the statute, even
though it did so in a very minor way. The Court's opinion focused
on the scope of the exemption found in Section 1 of the FAA,
which provides that the Act does not apply "to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 3 One of the
questions presented was "[w]hether the FAA's Section 1 exemption, which applies on its face only to 'contracts of employment,'
is
4
inapplicable to independent contractor agreements."
* Mary Ann G. McMorrow Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago. The author acknowledges the support of the Loyola University Chicago School of Law Summer Research
Grant Program.
1 This has been well documented in the literature. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul
Haagen, Contractand Jurisdiction,1996 SuP.CT. REV. 331; Linda R. Hirshman, the Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalizationof Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985); IAN R.
McNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW (1992); Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues
of Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 Nw. U.S. L. REV.
453 (1999); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created A
FederalArbitrationLaw Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 99 (2006); David
S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business Employee and Consumer Rights
Claims in an Age of Compulsory Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33; Thomas Stipanowich, The
Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American
Arbitration, 23 AMERICAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 2012.

2 New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S.Ct. 532 (2019). See, e.g., Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices uphold arbitrationexemption for transportationworkers in rare victory for arbitration

opponents, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/01/opinion-analysisjustices-uphold-arbitration-exemption-for-transportation-workers-in-rare-victory-for-arbitration
-opponents.
3 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).
4 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, New Prime, 139 S.Ct. 532 (No. 17-340). The second question presented was whether a court or an arbitrator should decide the question of whether the
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The dispute in New Prime was between an interstate trucking
company, New Prime, and one of its drivers, Dominic Oliveira,
over whether New Prime paid its drivers lawful wages. 5 When Mr.
Oliveira filed a class action suit, New Prime asked the court to
compel arbitration. Mr. Oliveira objected on the ground that he
could not be compelled to arbitrate because he was not subject to
the FAA as a transportation worker covered in Section l's exemptions. In response, New Prime asserted that the exemption only
covered trucking company employees, and that Mr. Oliveira was an
independent contractor rather than an employee. Therefore, he
could not benefit from the exemption and would need to proceed
to arbitration.
To resolve this dispute, the Court focused on the meaning of
the term "contract of employment." Justice Gorsuch, delivering
the unanimous decision, stated that the proper canon of statutory
construction is "that words generally should be 'interpreted as taking their ordinary... meaning... at the time Congress enacted the
statute."'6 Justice Gorsuch further stated that,
After all, if judges could freely invest old statutory terms with
new meanings, we would risk amending legislation outside the
,single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure"
the Constitution commands. INS v. Chadha, 462 US. 919, 951
(1983). We would risk, too, upsetting reliance interests in the
settled meaning of a statute. CF. 2B N. Singer & J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §56A:3 (rev. 7th
ed. 2012).7
Thus, the original meaning of the statute in 1925, according to
Justice Gorsuch, "holds the key to the case. ' After examining
that meaning at the time of the adoption of the Act in 1925, Justice
Gorsuch concluded that "contract of employment" usually meant
simply an agreement to perform work, and therefore, independent
contractors such as Mr. Oliveira were covered by the exemption
and could not be compelled to arbitrate.9
exemption under Section 1 applied. See id. The Court decided that a court should make this
determination. New Prime, 139 S.Ct. at 537.
5 Oliveira alleged that defendant New Prime violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and Missouri and Maine labor laws, by failing to pay its
truck drivers minimum wage. Oliveira v. New Prime Inc., 141 F.Supp.3d 125 (D. Ct. Mass. 2015).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.

9 See id.
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There is enormous irony in Justice Gorsuch's stated reasoning
that the proper way to interpret the FAA is to determine how the
statute was understood as of its drafting in 1925. Since 2001 the
statute has been understood quite differently from its original
meaning in 1925. In its decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ad-

ams,1° the Supreme Court did not share the unanimous view of the
current Supreme Court that the meaning of the statute at the time
the statute was adopted should prevail. Rather, the Circuit City
Court refused to consider the original meaning of the FAA in
1925-that all workers were exempted from the statute's coverage-and in direct contrast, judicially amended the statute by holding that all workers were covered under the FAA except workers
in interstate transportation.11
In reaching its decision, the Circuit City Court not only ignored the understanding of the 1925 Congress that no workers'
contracts were covered by the FAA, but also that this had been the
understanding of courts for decades following 1925.12 In the
1990's, however, some courts began to hold that workers were covered by the FAA, except for workers specifically excluded under
the exemption of Section 1. The courts determined that the FAA
exemption applied only to transportation workers.13 In 1999, the
Ninth Circuit decided differently, holding that no employment contracts were covered by the FAA.14 This circuit split led to the Supreme Court's 2001 Circuit City decision 15 that all workers were
covered by the FAA except workers in the transportation industry,
who were excluded under the exemption of Section 1.16
To reach its decision, the Circuit City Court necessarily
adopted an interpretative approach fundamentally different from
the approach endorsed by the unanimous decision of the Court in
New Prime that the proper way to interpret the FAA is to deter10 Circuit City Stores, Inc v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).

11 Id. at 119 ("Section I exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers.").
12 See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union of Los Angeles, AFL-CIO v. United States Pos-

tal Serv., 861 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever
expressly held the Federal Arbitration Act applicable to arbitration of labor disputes.").
13 See, e.g. McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 575-76 (10th Cir. 1998); O'Neil v.

Hilton Head Hospital, 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d
354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470-72 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Rojas v. TK Communications,Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1996); Asplundh Tree Co.

v. Bastes, 71 F.3d 592, 596-601 (6th Cir. 1995).
14 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).
15 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).

16 Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 28-35.
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mine how the statute was understood in 1925. However, among
the justices who formed the majority in Circuit City in 2001, only
one, Justice Clarence Thomas, is still on the Court.I v Moreover, if
one were starting with this issue on a clean slate, Justice Thomas
would probably not support the view that the FAA governs employment contracts. His strong and consistent history of dissents
over the years in FAA cases, which reflect his view of the narrow
scope of the commerce clause, suggest that for him, a proper interpretation of the statute as it was understood in 1925 would exclude
all workers.1 8 Thus, despite the pull of stare decisis, if, in fact, the
FAA was wrongly construed with respect to contracts of employment, the unanimous view of the Supreme Court in New Prime
might signal a possible new perspective on the issue of worker coverage under the FAA.
This article will discuss how, in a future case, if the Court applied the reasoning of its unanimous opinion in New Prime-that
the language of the statute should be interpreted consistent with
the meaning it had to the Congress that adopted it-no worker
would be covered by the FAA. Part I will consider the scope of the
Commerce Clause, and the expansion in the Court's understanding
of Congress' power under the Clause that occurred post-1925. In
Part II, the article will deal with the purpose of the FAA as understood at the time of its adoption, as well as the meaning and purpose of the exemption found in Section 1. In Part III, the Circuit
City case will be examined with respect to how the Supreme Court
judicially amended the statute by finding that ordinary workers
were covered by the FAA. Part IV will consider why Circuit City
should be overruled. Part V concludes the article.

II.

THE MEANING OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN

1925

Section 2 of the FAA provides in pertinent part that an arbitration agreement will be "valid, irrevocable and enforceable"
when an agreement to arbitrate is contained in writing in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce."19 In 1925,
17 Justices Rehnquist and Scalia are deceased, and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor have
retired. Only Justice Thomas remains on the Court of the justices in the majority.
18 See generally Brian Farkas, The Continuing Voice of Dissent: Justice Thomas and the Federal Arbitration Act, 22 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 33 (2016). See also discussion infra at 3-5.

19 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947). The complete section is as follows:
Maritime transactions," as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading of
water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs
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most workers were not considered to be in interstate commerce.
According to the courts at the time, Congress' power to regulate
commerce applied in interstate transactions, but not to transactions
that took place only in one state.2z
The history of the interpretation of the Commerce Clause
makes this clear. Courts and Congress in 1925 had a narrow understanding of Congress' power under the clause. 21 From the late
nineteenth century through around 1936, the Court tended to apply a theory of "Dual Federalism," which relied on the Tenth
Amendment to define and limit the powers of Congress.22 Under
this theory, the regulation of certain activities was reserved to the
states. 23 As an example, the Supreme Court, in Howard v. Illinois
Cent. R. Co.,24 found the Employer's Liability Act unconstitutional
because its application was not limited to employees who actually
functioned in interstate commerce. Instead, the Act applied both
to employees who were in interstate commerce, for example, a fireman on a locomotive, as well as to employees of the company who
were not functioning in interstate commerce, such as secretaries
and accountants. According to the Court, this made the Act unconstitutional because Congress had no power to exercise authority over employees who were not actually acting in interstate
commerce. The Court cited with approval the view of Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden,25 that the exercise of the commerce
power

20
21

to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject
of controversy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce," as
herein defined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or
in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any
such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign
nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign
nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
See, e.g., Howard v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 207 U.S. 463, 501-03 (1908).
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 106 (2001) (Souter, J. dissenting)

("When the Act was passed (and the commerce power was closely confined), our case law indicated that the only employment relationships subject to the commerce power were those in
which workers were actually engaged in interstate commerce.").
22 JOHN NOWAK AND RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8th edition, §4.5.
23 Id. The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides as follows: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
24 Howard, 207 U.S. at 504.
25 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to
those internal concerns which affect the states generally; but not
to those which are completely within a particular state, which do
not affect other states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some of the general powers
of the government.26
Thus, according to the Court in Howard, Congress did not
have the power to regulate employees of a railroad who worked ' in
"shops for repairs, construction work... accounting and clerical. 27
In other words, ordinary employees were not considered to be
functioning in interstate commerce, but rather were within the
boundaries of one state, and therefore not subject to regulation by
Congress. They were, according to the
Court, "subjects wholly be28
yond [Congress'] power to regulate.
Justice Thomas has taken a highly restrictive view of the Commerce Clause. 29 To him, based on the understanding at the time of
the founding, "the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate the buying and selling of goods and services trafficked across
state lines." 30 He has also noted the limitation that "Commerce, or
trade, stood in contrast to productive activities like manufacturing
and agriculture."3 1 Although the Supreme Court dramatically expanded that view of commerce toward the end of the 1930s,32 when
the FAA was passed in 1925 the Commerce Clause power could
only regulate employees who actually transported people or goods
in interstate commerce. Thus, when Congress adopted Section 2 of
the FAA, it was generally understood by everyone-courts,
26
27
28

Id. at 74.
Howard, 207 U.S. at 498.
Id. at 499. See also from 1924, United Leather Workers' Int'l Union v. Herkert & Meisel

Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924) (Court held that an illegal strike of leather workers did not
impact interstate commerce, because it concerned manufacture of goods and not transport and
delivery of the products.).
29 See Farkas, supra note 18, at 49.
30 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 58 (2005) (the dissent cites his earlier concurring decision in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
31 Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 58.
32 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 116. The Court noted that "Supreme Court decisions beginning in 1937 'ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the
previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause.'" (Citation omitted).
33 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 provides in full: "A written provision in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising
out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." (9 U.S.C. §2).
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members of Congress, proponents, and ordinary citizens-that the
Commerce Clause did not give Congress the power to adopt laws
regulating the employment of ordinary employees in manufacturing, agriculture and service jobs.

III.

THE PURPOSE OF THE

FAA

AND ITS EXEMPTION

The FAA never had any purpose to cover worker contracts.3 4
No organization or individual spoke at any of the hearings in favor
of applying the Act to workers. Rather, the drafters and promoters
of the FAA, who were businessmen and lawyers, sought to make
arbitration agreements enforceable between businesses. 35 They
were frustrated by the fact that even though two businesses might
have a written arbitration agreement in place, when a dispute arose
a party could decide that it no longer wanted to arbitrate and a
court would not enforce the agreement.
The business community strongly supported passage of the
FAA. At the joint hearings, one of the major proponents, Charles
Bernheimer, who chaired the arbitration committee of the Chamber of Commerce, told the Members of Congress, "[t]he statement
I make is backed up by 73 commercial organizations in this country
who have, by formal vote, approved of the bill before you gentlemen."3 6 He then offered the practical business case for passage:
[A]rbitration saves time, saves trouble, saves money... It pre-

serves business friendships. . .it raises business standards. It
maintains business honor, prevents unnecessary litigation,
and
3
eliminates the law's delay by relieving our courts. 1
34 See Matthew W. Finkin, Employment Contracts Under the FAA - Reconsidered, 48 LABOR
L. J. 329, 330 (1997) (hereinafter "Finkin, Workers' ContractsReconsidered"). Professor Finkin
noted that when an objection was raised to the legislation by labor organizations, which wanted
to ensure that workers' contracts were not covered by the bill, their concern was swiftly "rendered moot because the proponents were pressing a commercial arbitration law wholly unconcerned with employment. The unions' objection to including employment contracts was an
unanticipated and extraneous obstacle to achieving their objective. That obstacle was swiftly
removed by the simple expedient of the exemption."
35 The main concept behind the Act was to provide for enforceability of arbitration agreements between merchants-parties assumed to be of equal bargaining strength-enabling them to
resolve their disputes promptly and efficiently. See testimony of Charles Bernheimer, Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm. of
Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16, 37 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] at3, 7.
36 Id. at 7-8.
37 Id.

422 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 21:415
Thus, the purpose of the FAA was to provide for the enforceability in federal courts of arbitration agreements between
merchants, simplify the process and provide speedy justice, reduce
the congestion of court calendars and legal costs, and reduce technicality and formality to a minimum." The only objection ever
raised to the Act was that it should not cover workers. 9 This objection had been made by organized labor, in particular by the International Seamen's Union of America, and by the American
Federation of Labor ("AFL"). 40 The labor organizations believed
that because seamen and other workers functioned in interstate
commerce, the Act would cover them and unfairly compel arbitration of various matters between such workers and their employers,
and that it would undermine existing labor protective laws that the
workers had fought to secure.4 1 Moreover, their objection focused
not just on seamen and railroad workers, but on all workers in the
transportation trades. 42 At the International Seamen Union's convention in 1924, the convention resolved to continue cooperation
with the AFL "in preventing the enactment of any measure designed to fasten any species of compulsory arbitration upon any
group of workers in America.'
In response, the proponents explained to the labor organizations that the Act's only purpose was to cover merchant-tomerchant transactions. They also testified in the 1923 Hearings
that "[i]t is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor
disputes, at all."'44 Rather, they assured members of Congress that
the statute would only apply to contracts between merchants.
W.H.H. Piatt, the chairman of the Committee of Commerce,
38 Id. at 27, 34, 35.
39 See Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States Arbitration Act: An
Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 283-290 (1996).
40 See id.

41 See id. at 284-89.
42 See Finkin, supra note 40, at 289.
43 Id. (citing 27 Proc. Ann. Convention Int'l Seamen's Union Am. 100 (1924)).
44 Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Arbitration:
Hearing Before the Subcomm on S. 4213 and S. 4214 of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong. 9 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hearings]. Moreover, Bernheimer testified in this same hearing on behalf of the business associations he represented that "[t]he bill on the one hand aims to
eliminate friction, delay, and waste, and on the other to establish and maintain business amity... if inexpensive but dependable arbitration were possible instead of costly, time-consuming
and troublesome litigation, the risk [of doing business] would be correspondingly smaller and the
price made to conform therewith. Not only will the suggested law accomplish all of this, but it
will help to conserve perishable and semi-perishable food products, and save many millions of
dollars in foodstuffs, now wasted because of the lack of legally binding arbitration facilities... The merchants want this very badly." Id. at 3, 7.
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Trade, and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association, testified that the Act was "purely an act to give the merchants the
right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other
as to what their damages
are, if they want to do it. Now that is all
45
there is to this.
In addition to their explanations to the labor organizations
and their testimony before Congress, the FAA proponents suggested including additional language in the Act to ensure that
workers in interstate commerce would not be covered. Piatt proposed adding the following language: "nothing herein contained
shall apply to seamen or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. '46 This amended language was
strongly supported by Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, who sent a letter to Congress, incorporated in both the 1923
Hearings and the 1924 Joint Hearings, which emphasized that the
legislation would not apply to workers. 47 Hoover proposed adding
essentially the same language as Piatt, with the addition of "railroad employees." This language was adopted almost verbatim in
the Act's exemption. 4 Thus, the purpose of adding this language
was to satisfy the objection of labor organizations that some employees, in particular seamen and railroad employees, might fall
within the Act because they were conceivably acting in interstate
commerce. 49 The catchall clause at the end "or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" was meant to
capture any other workers, such as interstate truck and bus drivers
who also functioned in interstate commerce.5 0 At the time, this
clause would not have been understood to apply to ordinary workers because they were not considered to be in interstate commerce
and were therefore beyond Congress' power to regulate.

45 Id. at 9.
46

Id.

47 See id. at 14; Joint Hearings, supra note 35, at 21.
48

The only difference was that Hoover's language referenced "any other class of workers

engaged in INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMERCE," and the language adopted reversed the terms
to read "FOREIGN OR INTERSTATE COMMERCE."
49 As a result, the bill passed without objection. In 1925, immediately after the bill's passage,
the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law noted in an article published in
the ABA Journal, "not a single dissenting vote was registered in either House or Senate." THE
UNITED STATES ARBITRATION LAW AND ITS APPLICATION, 11 A.B.A. J. 153 (1925).
50 See Finkin, Workers' Contracts Reconsidered, supra note 35, at 330.
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IV.

THE SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS THE

FAA

IN

CIRCUIT

CITY TO COVER ORDINARY WORKERS

A.

Rejecting Legislative History and History
of the Commerce Clause

In Circuit City, the Supreme Court appeared to ignore the
concern that the unanimous Court in New Prime considered critical that a court should not "freely invest old statutory terms with
new meanings. ' 51 Instead, the Court rejected the original meaning
of the statute in 1925 that the FAA did not cover ordinary workers,
and proclaimed that no workers were excluded from the FAA except transportation workers. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court had to ignore or deny the legislative history of the
FAA that set forth the purpose of the exemption, and more surprisingly, the legal history of the development and expansion of the
Commerce Clause.
With respect to the legislative history, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that it was not necessary to consider
legislative history because the Court's conclusion was "directed by
the text of § 1.1152 However, he then went on to address the legislative history, noting that "the legislative record on the § 1 exemption is quite sparse. ' 53 Justice Kennedy's opinion in Circuit City
completely ignored the reason the legislative history of this provision was not more developed. The obvious reason is that the exemption was uncontroversial because no one thought any workers
were intended to be covered by the act.5 4 One would expect that if
Congress were considering whether or not most workers should be
covered by the FAA, there would have been significant policy discussions about how arbitration of worker-employer disputes would
impact the labor field and the economy.5 5 What the "sparse" legislative history shows, however, is that Congress did not think it nec51 New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S.Ct. 532, 539, 586 (2019).

52 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
53 Id.

54 See id., (J. Stevens, dissenting) "History amply supports the proposition that [the exemption] was an uncontroversial provision that merely confirmed the fact that no one interested in
the enactment of the FAA ever intended or expected that § 2 would apply to employment
contracts."
55 See Finkin, Workers' Contracts Reconsidered, supra note 35, at 332 (commenting that
there was no notice of the FAA in any of the labor law journals or other publications atthe time,
because "[1]ike
the dog who didn't bark, the total want of any mention of the Act by close
contemporary observers, advocates, and students of labor legislation speaks eloquently: there
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essary to have such policy discussions. Rather, it dealt with this
issue quite simply and easily by excluding all workers
and enacting
56
a statute that dealt only with merchant disputes.
In addition to disparaging the legislative history because it was
"sparse," Justice Kennedy asserted that any legislative history was
problematic, expressing doubt that the particular intent of a group
can be determined. 5 7 The opinion in Circuit City represents what
may be a high point in the Court's use of textualism. Textualists
assert that legislative intent is virtually impossible to ascertain because most members of Congress may not be aware of a particular
issue or how it was resolved. 5' However, there has been a resurgence of interest in the importance of legislative history and a
deepening understanding of how the legislative process can be understood as the collective intent of Congress. Solid scholarly support for using the history of the legislative process as a valid and
reliable concept of collective intent has emerged from the fields of
analytic philosophy of language and political science.59
Legislative history, as well as legal history, can be valuable in
ascertaining the meaning of a statute at the time it was enacted.
However, contrary to the New Prime Court's view that a proper
interpretation of the FAA must focus on the meaning of the statute
at the time it was adopted in 1925, the Court in Circuit City disconnected the text of the exemption from the understanding of the
was no need for them to mention a commercial arbitration law from which employment contracts had been altogether excluded.")
56 See Finkin, supra note 40 at 299. "Whether or not individual employment disputes should
be swept into unilaterally promulgated arbitration plans, whether these arbitration systems
should include not only federal labor protective laws but also claims deriving from state statutes
and common law, and just what the federal interest is in the latter instance, are large questions of
public policy. Congress chose at the time to avoid dealing with them by exempting
employment."
57 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 120.
58 Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 32
(1997). In contrast, Justice Stevens has noted that "[1]egislators, like other busy people, often
depend on the judgment of trusted colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities. If
a statute... has bipartisan support and has been carefully considered by committees familiar
with the subject matter, Representatives and Senators may appropriately rely on the view of the
committee members in casting their votes. In such circumstances, since most Members are content to endorse the views of the responsible committees, the intent of those involved in the
drafting process is properly regarded as the intent of the entire Congress." Bank One Chicago v.
Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
59 See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualizationof Legislative History in the Supreme Court,
2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 206-07, 251-71 ("Individuals have a collective intention when they act
together with an aim, especially in institutions... In sum, legislative history consists of the stepwise progress of legislation, in which the text is adjusted by the decisions of a collective intention."); id. at 256, 262.
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statute in 1925 and made a decision based on its own policy preference, which was for the statute to cover ordinary workers.
Although it may not be surprising that a Supreme Court
strongly influenced by textualism would denigrate legislative history, it is nonetheless curious that the unequivocal history of the
interpretation of the Commerce Clause would not weigh more
heavily in the Circuit City Court's interpretation of the exemption
in Section 1. It was known to the Supreme Court that the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause was viewed quite narrowly
in 1925, and that the Congress of 1925 would have believed that
regulation of ordinary workers' contracts was wholly beyond its
power. 61 Yet, this basic fact-that in 1925, no ordinary workers
were covered by the FAA-was not considered by the Court in its
contrary determination in 2001 that all workers were covered by
the FAA except transportation workers. Rather, in its interpretation of the exemption in Circuit City, the Court maintained that
workers were covered because the language "engaged in,"'6 1 found
in the exemption in Section 1, was not as broad as the language
"involved in," found in the coverage provisions of Section 2.
In her concurrence to New Prime, Justice Ginsburg agreed
that "words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordi62
nary. . .meaning. . .at the time Congress enacted the statute.
However, she noted that sometimes it was proper for a statute to
expand or contract its scope in light of changes in the law or the
world. Such changes might "require [the] application [of words
in statutes] to new instances or make old applications
63
anachronistic.
Thus, in accordance with Justice Ginsburg's view, the Court in
Circuit City could quite properly have said that consistent with the
circumscribed Commerce Clause in 1925, no ordinary workers
were covered by the FAA. Yet because the Commerce Clause
power expanded post-1925 to include regulation of ordinary workers' contracts, the Court should find that the exemption, by excluding all workers in interstate commerce, now meant that consistent
with the intent of the 1925 Congress all workers-ordinary workers
60

See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 116 (majority view of narrow scope of Commerce Clause in

1925); see also id. at 136 (dissent's view of narrow scope of Commerce Clause in 1925).
61 Section 2 provides that the FAA applies to "a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce" (emphasis added) (9 U.S.C. § 2). Section I provides that the FAA does not apply
"to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" (emphasis added) (9 U.S.C. § 1).
62 New Prime, 139 S.Ct. at 544, 586 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (citations omitted).
63 Id.
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as well as railroad workers and seamen-were excluded. In other
words, even though ordinary workers were not originally considered to be in interstate commerce, the expanded conception of interstate commerce would now encompass them, but, nonetheless,
the exemption would exclude them.
Thus, if the Court had recognized the meaning understood by
the Congress in 1925 to be that ordinary workers were not covered
by the Commerce Clause, an interpretation consistent with that
meaning would be that today, under the expanded Commerce
Clause, ordinary workers would be excluded from the FAA by the
language of the exemption. As Justice Souter noted in dissent in
Circuit City, "[t]he statute is.. .entitled to a coherent reading as a
whole by treating the exemption for employment contracts as
keeping pace with the expanded understanding of the commerce
power generally."6 4

B.

Restricting the Construction of the Exemption

In order to disregard the purpose of the 1925 Congress to exclude all workers, the Circuit City Court had to justify why the last
phrase of the exemption, which excluded "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," did not, contrary
to its plain meaning, apply to all workers, since in modern times all
workers would be considered to be in interstate commerce. Its
anomalous construction resulted in a fossilized exemption despite a
greatly expanded Commerce Clause. To try to justify this anomaly,
the Circuit City Court had several strategies, none consistent with
the New Prime Court's interpretive standard requiring a court to
consider the meaning of the provision at the time it was adopted.
First, the Court engaged in an extensive Jesuitical analysis of
why "involving commerce"-the term used in the coverage language of Section 2-provided a more extensive reach under the
Commerce Clause than "engaged in commerce"-the term used in
the exemption language of Section 1. The Court found that "involving commerce" indicated "Congress' intent to regulate to the
outer limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause. 6' 5 In its
view, "engaged in commerce" had a more limited reach."6 Thus, it
64
65
66

See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 137 (Souter, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
Id.
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viewed the coverage provisions of Section 2 as far broader than the
exemption in Section 1.
This analysis, with respect to interpreting the meaning of the
exemption, is not persuasive for a number of reasons. For one,
there is no indication that Congress in 1925 considered these terms
to be different.6 7 Furthermore, none of the cases cited by the Circuit City Court in support of a more restricted meaning for "engaged in commerce" dealt with the question that was before the
Court: "whether exemption language is 6to
be read as petrified
8
when coverage language is read to grow.
In addition, the Court not only rejected respondent's arguments in Circuit City that the terms "involving commerce" and
"engaged in commerce" were coterminous, but it also came up
with another justification for changing the meaning of the FAA.
The exemption of Section 1 provides that the Act "shall not apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."6 9 The Court asserted the last clause ("any other class of
workers engage in foreign or interstate commerce") is a "residual
clause," and therefore the wording of Section 1 calls for the application of the maxim ejusdem generis.7 ° This is the Court's second
strategy to try to shore up its unorthodox interpretation of the exemption. Ejusdem generis is a canon of construction that says that
when you have one or more definite terms followed by a general
term, the general term should be limited to the same category as
the terms previously listed. Thus, because seamen and railroad
workers were mentioned specifically, the Court is using this canon
to assert that "workers in foreign or interstate commerce" are limited to "transportation workers."
There are three main reasons why ejusdem generis is inappropriately applied. First, in prior decisions, the Court has declared
67 See Heidi M.

Hellekson, Taking the Alternative Out of Dispute Resolution of Title VII

Claims: The Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of Arbitration Agreements Arising
Out of Employment Contracts,70 N. DAK. L. REV. 435 at 445, note 89 (citations omitted). Hel-

lekson also makes a simple grammatical argument against finding that "involving commerce"
and "engaged in commerce" are different. They have different subjects. The statutory language
refers to "transactions involving commerce" in section 2, and "a class of workers engaged in
commerce" in section 1. One would not say that a transaction was "engaged in commerce" or
that a class of workers was "involving commerce." She argues that Congress in 1925 most likely
selected the different terms in order to be grammatically correct, not to indicate a different
exercise of the commerce power.
68 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 137 (Souter, J. dissenting).
69 9 U.S.C 1.
70 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114.
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that the canon is only triggered by an uncertain statutory text, and
that it can be overcome by contrary legislative history."v Here, the
Court turns this concept on its head by announcing that the text of
the statute is so clear that legislative history is not needed, although ejusdem generis is.7 2 Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit noted,
Since the intention of congress manifestly was to confine the
Act to commercial disputes, ejusdem generis has no possible relevance here. As said in Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124
(1936), it [the rule of ejusdem generis] may not be used to defeat
the obvious purpose of the legislation. 3
In Circuit City, the Court seems to be using ejusdem generis
for exactly the wrong reason, which is to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to exclude all workers contracts from the
FAA.
Second, the Court's analysis of the text is simply not warranted under ejusdem generis. The maxim is supposed to help clarify intent when the general term is vague. However, this general
term did not simply say "any other class of workers." Rather, it
specifically said, "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." This specificity makes clear the kind of
workers to which Congress was referring and should eliminate any
need to call upon ejusdem generis to understand the plain meaning
of the terms.
This concept can perhaps be best understood by comparing
the application of ejusdem generis in this case with another example. Assume a bill of sale for a farm included "cows, sheep and
other animals." "Other animals" would probably not be interpreted to mean the pet puppy of the farmer's child.14 Rather, ejusdem generis could be used to say that "other animals" only meant
"other farm animals," and not a pet puppy. However, in the instant case, by providing the specific classification, "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," the phrase needs no added clarity by
71

See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74-75 (1984); Gooch v. United States, 297

U.S. 124 (1936); Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 44 (1983).
72 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114, 115, 119.
73 Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir.1999). This case contained the
Ninth Circuit's initial ruling that all employment contracts were excluded under the FAA. The
Ninth Circuit's subsequent Circuit City decision, which was reversed by the Supreme Court, was
a per curiam opinion that largely summarized the arguments that had been more fully made in
the Craft case. Thus, Circuit City, at its core, is a review of the Craft decision; See Finkin, supra
note 40, at 298 (footnotes omitted).
74 See Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretationand Constructionof Contracts, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 833, 853 (1964).
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the application of ejusdem generis. Comparing it to the farm bill
example, if the bill of sale had actually provided the additional
specificity of "other farm animals," suppose the farmer then tried
to argue that under ejusdem generis, farm animals meant only animals that gave milk, like cows and sheep. This is a step too far.
Ejusdem generis is not proper when the meaning of the general
term is plain.
Finally, the third reason that the use of ejusdem generis is improper is explained by Justice Souter in his dissent in Circuit City,
"ejusdem generis is a fallback, and if there are good reasons not to
apply it, it is put aside. '7 5 He then concluded that there were good
reasons in this case to put the canon aside. One of the reasons is
that the assertion that the FAA only excludes transportation workers defies logic. Why would Congress in 1925 bar from FAA coverage only the class of employment contracts that it had the most
obvious authority to regulate (transportation workers), while allegedly covering classes of ordinary workers that, in 1925, it did not
have the power to regulate?
Nonetheless, as noted by the Supreme Court in Circuit City,
by 1999, a majority of circuit courts had held that the FAA covered
all workers except transportation workers, which were found to be
excluded under the exemption.7 6 However, as discussed by the
Ninth Circuit, these courts were taking a contemporary view of a
statute which is not a modern statute.7 7 The circuit court decisions
all ignored the obvious fact that in 1925, Congress did not have the
power to regulate employment contracts of ordinary workers. As
Matthew Finkin has explained:
The [FAA] exempts contracts of employment, all contracts of
employment, over which congress had constitutional authority.
The scope of the commerce power when the [FAA] was enacted
was quite narrow; in the employment setting, it was limited
largely to transportation workers. Thus, in 1925, the [FAA]
could not have applied to an arbitration provision in the employment contract of a neo-natal physician, a manufacturing
manager, or a secretary in a law firm, because these employees
would not have been considered as being in interstate commerce. As the commerce power has been expanded by the
United States Supreme Court, the exemption has expanded
along with it,
leaving the status of employees' contracts in practical effect just as they were when the Act passed. The contrary
75 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 138 (Souter, J. dissenting).
76 Id. at 110-11.
77 Craft, 177 F.3d at 1086 (1998).
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(though currently prevailing view [among circuit courts]) produces an anomaly. v8
The anomalous result reached by the various circuit courts
cited in Circuit City stemmed from anachronistic reasoning, because the courts' discussions of the meaning of "involving commerce" and "engaged in commerce" relied on post-1937 concepts
of such terms. v9 The circuit courts seemed to have had no interest
in ascertaining the meaning of the statute at the time it was enacted-contrary to the interpretive standard endorsed by the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court in New Prime.8 ° Rather, the
federal appellate courts' focus on these terms served to avoid the
logical and reasonable conclusion that in 1925, Congress was not
concerned with the nuances of Commerce Clause terms because
ordinary employees were wholly outside the power of Congress to
regulate.
Judge Richard Posner engaged in another attempt to deal with
the lack of logic in the theory that Congress only intended to exempt the workers it clearly could regulate, while including those it
could not.8 1 In Taylor v. Pryner, Judge Posner speculated that
Congress
soon noticed that the railroad industry's labor relations were
also heavily regulated - by a statute (the Railway Labor Act)
that included provisions for compulsory arbitration of many
disputes. More carriers were not yet comprehensively regulated, but it may have seemed (and was) only a matter of time
before they would be, hence, the expansion of the exclusion
from seamen to railroad to other transportation workers. It
seems to us ...that this history supports rather than undermines

limiting "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"
transportation. 82

to

Judge Posner's speculation was based on a clear error of fact.
Congress in 1925 did not "notice" the Railway Labor Act, because
it was not enacted until 1926, a year after the effective date of the
FAA. The law governing railroad workers at the time of the hear78

See Finkin, supra note 40, at298 (footnotes omitted).

79 See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (where Judge
Edwards discusses difference in "involving commerce' and "incommerce," relying only on post
1950's interpretations of the terms).
8o The Supreme Court held that words generally should be "interpreted as taking their ordinary.. meaning... at the time Congress enacted the statute." New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139
S.Ct. 532, 539 (2019).
81 See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997).
82 Id.
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ings and adoption of the FAA, the Transportation Act of 1920,
made no provision for compulsory arbitration.8 3 Moreover, Congress cannot be deemed to have anticipated future regulation of
truckers or busmen, whose contracts would only be regulated a full
decade later through collective bargaining under the Wagner Act
of 1935.84 Thus, contrary to Judge Posner's conjecture, history in
fact undermines any logical reason why Congress would intend that
the FAA cover ordinary workers while excluding only transportation workers. Nonetheless, the Circuit City Supreme Court, citing
favorably Judge Posner's decision in Pryner, opined that "[i]t
would be rational for Congress to ensure that workers in general
would be covered by the provisions of the FAA, while reserving for
itself more specific legislation for those engaged in transportation. '8 5 This determination of "rationality" completely ignores the
original meaning of the statute. The legislative history of the FAA,
as well as the history of the Commerce Clause, did not permit Congress in 1925 to "ensure that workers in general would be covered
by the provisions of the FAA."

C.

Ignoring CongressionalConcerns about Adhesion Contracts

A final failure of the Circuit City Court to understand the
meaning of the FAA enacted by the 1925 Congress stems from its
lack of recognition of an important congressional concern. It was
generally recognized at that time that compulsory arbitration
would impermissibly upset the balance of power between the economically strong and the weak. At the joint hearings, Senator
Walsh of Montana expressed concern about whether the legislation
would apply to contracts which were not really voluntary, where
one party had more bargaining power and would require a contract
to be signed on a "take-it-or leave-it basis." He stated:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into are really not voluntary things at all
...
It is the same with a good many contracts of employment. A
man says, "These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it."
Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it.86
One of the proponents, W.H.H.Piatt, testified in response:
See Finkin, Workers' Contracts Reconsidered, supra note 35, at 331.
Id.
85 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121 (citing Pryner,supra note 82 (Posner, C.J.)).
86 Joint Hearings, supra note 35, at9.
83

84
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I would not favor any kind of legislation that would permit the
forcing a man to sign that kind of [sic] contract.8 7
Although the Circuit City Court briefly mentions that the
FAA was intended to "broadly overcome judicial hostility to arbitration,"8 8 the decision does not focus on the fact that a good part
of this hostility was based on concern by courts that arbitration
would not sufficiently protect the rights of the ordinary citizen
against the rich and powerful.8 9 Julius Cohen, one of the primary
drafters, explained during the Joint Hearings in Congress that one
of the reasons judges had refused to enforce arbitration agreements in the past was a concern that the law would permit a party
with greater economic strength to compel a weaker party to arbitrate. He testified as follows:
[T]he real fundamental cause was that at the time this rule was
made people were not able to take care of themselves in making
contracts, and the stronger men would take advantage of the
weaker and the courts had to come in and protect them. And
the courts said, "if you let the people sign away their rights, the
powerful people will come in and take away the rights of the
weaker ones." And that is still true to a certain extent. 90
Cohen and his fellow proponents responded to congressional concerns over whether the FAA would compel arbitration in insurance, employment or other contracts imposed on a "take-it-or
leave-it basis" 91 by emphasizing that the legislation would not ap-

ply in adhesion contracts because it was specifically aimed only at
the resolution of disputes between merchants, and would only apply to their voluntary agreements. 92 There was testimony that arbitration under the FAA was "a purely voluntary thing. [The
Id. at 10.
88 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 118-19.
89 See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 340 ("[T]he existence of genuine mutual assent
87

was suspect when parties agreed to arbitrate a future dispute, and.., a dispute resolution clause
could be a trap for the unwary. As one court put it: 'by first making the contract and then
declaring who should construe it, the strong could oppress the weak, and in effect so nullify the
law as to secure the enforcement of contracts usurious, illegal, immoral, or contrary to public
policy."' Parsonsv. Ambos, 121 Ga 98, 48 SE 696 (1904); See also Handbook, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 60-73 (1924). ("This view of commercial reality
... led to the opinion that the best way to assure true assent to arbitration was to afford a party
having promised to arbitrate a future dispute an opportunity to withdraw assent when a real
dispute has arisen and the revoking party is at last likely to be attentive to the hazards of dispute
resolution and well-advised.").
90 Joint Hearings, supra note 36, at 15.
91 Id. at 9.
92 Id. at 9-15.
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legislation] is only the idea that arbitration may now have the aid
of the court to enforce these provisions which men voluntarily
enter into."93
Moreover, in objecting to the FAA, the president of the International Seamen's Union, Andrew Fursuth, made clear that the
ISU was concerned about an imbalance in power that would occur
if the FAA could be imposed on workers by their employers:
Will such contracts be signed? Esau agreed, because he was hungry. It was the desire to live that caused slavery to begin and
continue. With the growing hunger in modern society, there will
be but few that will be able to resist. The personal hunger of the
seamen, and the hunger of the wife and children of the railroad
man will surely tempt them to sign, and so with9 4 sundry other
workers in, "Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
It is important to note that the ISU was concerned not only
about forced arbitration affecting seamen and railroad workers,
but also wanted to prevent enactment of any law that would impose "any species of compulsory arbitration upon any group of
95
workers in America.
The concern to protect workers from compulsory arbitration,
which underlay the sole objection to the FAA, and which the 1925
Congress met by adding the exemption in section 1, was simply
disregarded by the Supreme Court in Circuit City. Rather, the
Court ignored congressional intent to exclude all workers from
coverage under the FAA and proceeded to judicially amend the
statute.

V.

CIRCUIT CITY SHOULD BE OVERRULED

New Prime's conclusion that the FAA must be interpreted to
reflect its original meaning at the time it was adopted is clearly the
proper way to interpret the statute. The Supreme Court has emphasized that "it is always appropriate to assume that our elected
representatives, like other citizens, know the law." 96 Furthermore,
it is presumed that Congress legislates against this background. 9v It
93 See id. at 26 (testimony of Alexander Rose).
94 See 26 Proc. Ann. Convention Int'l Seamen's Union Am. at 203-04 (1923).
95 See id. at 100.
96 Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S.

577, 696-97 (1979).
97 Id.
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is beyond cavil that the 1925 Congress knew that ordinary workers
were beyond its power to regulate. It also apparent from the legislative history of the Act that Congress wanted to appease labor,
the only group that opposed the FAA at all, by making sure that
workers who fell within interstate commerce and could be regulated by Congress were exempted in order to exclude ALL workers from the FAA's coverage. Thus, Congress' intent is clear and
easily understood. Because the Circuit City Court ignored the 1925
Congress' understanding of the Commerce Clause, which was the
background against which it legislated and which informed the legislation it adopted, Circuit City should be overruled.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The legislative history demonstrating that Congress intended
to exclude all workers' contracts from the FAA was not ambiguous. In fact, Justice O'Connor, in her dissent in another controversial Supreme Court decision, Southland Corp. v. Keating,98 said
"[o]ne rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the
FAA's." 99 Yet, the Supreme Court in Circuit City freely and deliberately ignored legislative history and the appropriate 1925 view of
the Commerce Clause in order to give the FAA a meaning the
1925 Congress never intended and worked hard to avoid.
What might have motivated the Supreme Court to ignore wellaccepted interpretive norms to reach a result that nullified the 1925
Congressional intent? One motivation may have been to preserve
judicial resources by requiring worker disputes to be resolved by
private means.1 00 A second appears to be a desire to favor the
freedom of those having sufficient economic strength to contract
out of effective judicial enforcement of regulations adverse to their
interests. Moving worker cases to arbitration avoids jury trials,
permits the exclusion of class actions and the elimination of punitive damages, and places disputes before private arbitrators likely
to come from the business community, less likely to be as welltrained as judges in the complexities of labor and discrimination
law, and subject to being less than impartial because they may want
the employer to choose them again for future arbitrations. Regardless of the Supreme Court's motivation, however, the result of
98 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
99 Id. at 25.
100 See Carrington and Hagen, supra note 1, at332.
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its interpretation of the FAA exemption was to put workers in exactly the position Congress and labor organizations in 1925 had
sought to avoid-permitting employers to impose take-it-or-leaveit requirements on workers to arbitrate disputes.
This could never have happened had the unanimous view of
the proper way to interpret the FAA, expressed by the current Supreme Court in New Prime, held sway in earlier times. However,
twenty years on, it may not be likely that today's Court will overturn its predecessors' faulty decision in Circuit City that amended
the FAA to cover worker contracts. Nonetheless, the Court's current unanimous view that the FAA should be interpreted based on
the meaning of the statute in 1925 is worthy of attention, and worthy of review by today's Congress.
Since 2001, a version of an act known as the Arbitration Fairness Act has been introduced a number of times in Congress.1" 1
The act would prevent pre-dispute arbitration agreements from being forced upon workers and consumers. If enacted, arbitration
would still be a possible way to resolve disputes, but only if the
parties freely chose arbitration over a court action once they knew
what the dispute entailed. This would provide an incentive for employers to ensure that any arbitration process was fair and impartial, and to present workers with a desirable way to resolve a
dispute. To date, the bill has not fared well, but depending on a
future election cycle, there might be a better chance for another
Congress to provide workers with protection of the rights that the
1925 Congress intended to protect when it enacted the FAA.

101 The most recent version, Arbitration Fairness for Consumers Act, S.630, 116th Congress
(2019-2020) was introduced in the Senate by Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH) on February 28,
2019.

